ABSTRACT Blockchain can potentially be deployed in a wide range of applications due to its capability to ensure decentralization, transparency, and immutability. In this paper, we design a cryptographic membership authentication scheme (i.e., authenticating graph data) to support blockchain-based identity management systems (BIMS). Such a system is designed to bind a digital identity object to its real-world entity. Specifically, we introduce a new transitively closed undirected graph authentication (TCUGA) scheme, which only needs to use node signatures (e.g., certificates for identifying nodes). The trapdoor hash function used in our scheme allows the signer to efficiently update the certificates without the need to re-sign the nodes. In other words, our scheme is efficient even though the graph dynamically adds or deletes vertices and edges. Moreover, our proposal can efficiently provide a proof when the edge between two vertices does not exist, thus solving the existing intractability issue in transitive signature (the main tool for authenticating graph data). Finally, we prove the security of our proposed TCUGA in the standard model and evaluate its performance to show its feasibility for BIMS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of blockchain is evidenced in the attempts to implement blockchain in applications ranging from finance [1] - [4] , data storage [5] , [6] , Internet of Things (IoT) [7] - [9] , data provenance [10] , [11] , identity [12] - [14] , and so on. There has also been attempts to integrate blockchain with cryptographic designs and applications [15] , [16] . Blockchain-based approaches have the potential to enhance decentralisation, transparency, and immutability, moreover, different applications have different cryptographic/security requirements. For instance, a model with amount hiding property or anonymity requirement requires an appropriate non-interactive zero knowledge scheme [3] , [17] , and a distributed data outsourcing and verifiable computation system design requires a specified functional algorithm [18] - [20] . In this paper, we mainly focus on the authentication of membership to support the design of blockchain-based identity management systems (BIMS).
BIMS such as those presented in [12] and [14] utilizes blockchain to build digital identity objects (i.e. Personal Identification Number, PIN) and validate their bindings to real-world entities. Fig. 1 shows an overview of the identity ledger building process [14] . In such a process, when a member wishes to bind his/her real-world public attributes to a PIN, he/she chooses a provider to validate the PIN then records this into the blockchain. Here, the provider must own a completed identity, meaning that it has been validated by an (independent) authority. Then, other members will authenticate the PIN to increase its credibility. Notably, all the involved authentications (i.e. authority-provider, providermember, member-member) are chained into the blockchain for a public verification, and any member seeking like to authenticate another entity needs to provide the certification of their membership (i.e. represented by the red line in Fig. 1 ).
However, membership authentication is generally not considered in existing BIMS, such as the approach of Muftic [14] . We posit the importance of membership authentication and for this activity to be undertaken by an administrative authority. For instance, assuming that Alice and Bob are working for the same organisation, and Alice should provide their interpersonal relationship when she wishes to authenticate Bob's PIN. Otherwise, Bob can require many non-interpersonal ones to authenticate his PIN, which will result in an 'unfaithful' credibility. Generally, the administrative authority (e.g. the organisation's cyber security team) generates the certificate between two members to prove their relationship. This will, however, incur significant computational costs since every pair requires a separate signed certificate, and clearly not scalable.
In this paper, we propose achieving membership authentication in BMIS using a graph data system formed by different equivalence classes (see Section III-A as an example). In the undirected graph, vertices and edges represent company members and their relationship (e.g. administrative domains) respectively. Transitive signature is an efficient authentication tool for graph data, and in such a scheme the signer only needs to sign a targeted graph's (denoted as G) transitive reduction graph (here, transitive reduction of G has the same transitive closure as G, but has the least number of edges). After signing the transitive reduction graph, the signer sends all signatures to an administrator (which is responsible for securely storing the signatures and replying users' queries). According to the composition algorithm in transitive signatures, the administrator or others can directly compute a novel signature of the composed edge. That is, given two signatures of edges (i, j) and (j, k), one can compose the signature of edge (i, k) without the original signer's signing private key. This composition property can help the signer to minimize computational costs (i.e. the complexity reduces from O(N 2 ) to O(N ) [21] ).
While there are a number of transitive signature schemes for undirected graphs in the literature, such proposals generally support only dynamically adding and not edge deletion (e.g. when a user leaves an organisation). In addition, the administrator cannot efficiently provide the certificate of non-existent edges. A trivial method is for the signer to sign non-existent edges using his/her private key. This, however, is impractical for a large number of non-existent edges which is generally the case for most larger organisations. In order to design a more practical authentication for blockchain-based identities management system, we are motivated to design a scheme that can dynamically and efficiently update vertices and edges in the undirected graph.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
We leverage the inner relation between vertices' public labels to eliminate edge signatures. Modified signature schemes (i.e., standard hash functions used in standard signature schemes are replaced by trapdoor hash functions [22] ) are adopted so that the signer only needs to recompute the randomness using trapdoor hash functions for vertices updated in the corresponding equivalence class (see Section V). In our scheme, an administrator can directly reply with the certificates of the queried vertices to prove their relationship even when they are not in the same equivalence class. After updating the nodes' certificates, the signer only needs to send the new certificates to the administrator, and the administrator chains them into the blockchain to invalidate the previous ones (i.e. only the latest public labels of a node are valid due to the use of timestamp in the certificate). In order to prevent the malicious propagation of certificates by requestors, we propose that designated verifier signatures can be integrated into our scheme in future work.
B. PAPER ORGANIZATION
Related work and relevant preliminaries are presented in Sections II and III, respectively. In Section IV, we present the security model of our proposed TCUGA, prior to presenting the scheme in Section V. Also in the latter, we present the scheme's security and performance analysis. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Transitive signature is first proposed by Micali and Rivest [23] , who presented two secure concrete schemes based on discrete logarithm and RSA assumptions, respectively. The RSA-based scheme is only proven to be transitively unforgeable (see Section IV-A) against non-adaptive chosen message attacks. In a latter work, the scheme is proven against adaptive attacks based on the one-more RSAinversion assumption [24] . Bellare and Neven [24] also used other assumptions (i.e. the factoring, one-more discrete logarithm and gap Diffie-Hellman groups) to construct secure schemes in the standard model, as well as introducing a hashing method to avoid generating node certificates (i.e. undirected and stateless transitive signature schemes). Such an approach minimizes the computation cost at the cost of security (i.e. only secure in the random oracle model, rather than the standard model). In addition, the hash adopted in their schemes is a special hash function (i.e. MapToPoint), which is difficult to build in practice.
Lin et al. [25] then proposed a new undirected and stateless transitive signature scheme using general cryptographic hash functions (e.g., MD6 or SHA-512). The scheme is proven secure in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the M2SDH problem. There are also several other transitive signature schemes, but most of which are all designed only for undirected graph [26] - [29] .
Transitive signature schemes for general directed graphs may be infeasible, since the construction forms a Abelian trapdoor group known as the infeasible inversion that does not have a known construction [30] . Existing directed transitive schemes were merely designed for special directed graphs (e.g., directed trees) and proven secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks [31] - [34] . Moreover, the schemes in [32] and [34] were designed without edge signatures. Edges are authenticated via the inner relation (e.g., character strings or codes) between two vertices. This inspires us to apply this method into the authentication of undirected graph.
Apart from transitive signatures, Xu [33] explained how one can utilize redactable signatures [35] to authenticate general directed graphs. First, the signer signs the total directed graph using redactable signatures, prior to sending the signatures to the administrator. Once someone queries for the existence of edge (i, j), the administrator can redact the total signature and obtain the queried edge signature according to the redactable signature's property.
We note that the above authentication tools for graph data would not be effective when the graph dynamically deletes the edge's vertices. This is also observed by Ma et al. [36] , who then designed a new authentication tool using the oneway accumulator for undirected graph. Unlike transitive signature schemes for undirected graphs, their scheme does not require edge signatures. Instead of the standard digital signatures, they utilize the one-way accumulators to eliminate the need of a signature on its edges. The administrator can directly reply with the node certificates to prove the edge even if it does not exist. Their scheme requires smaller storage yet achieves higher efficiency, as well as allowing the graph to dynamically remove vertices or edges. However, the signer needs to re-sign all nodes once the graph deletes or adds vertices (or edges) in the same equivalence class. This, as explained earlier, incurs significant computational costs. Hence, we focus on the design of a more efficient authentication scheme suitable for BIMS.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the preliminaries related to our proposed scheme. First, we present the relevant notations.
The notation N = {1, 2, . . . N } denotes the set of positive integers from 1 to N , and Z * q denotes the multiplicative group of integers modulo q. The notation x ← S indicates that x is selected randomly and uniformly from set S. f : N → R is a negligible function if follows: ∀m > 0, there exists n 0 for all n > n 0 : f (n) < 1/n m . A PPT algorithm is marked as a probabilistic algorithm with polynomial runtime.
A. GRAPHS
Membership authentication in BIMS is an authentication graph-based structure. Here, we define G = (V , E) as an undirected graph, where V ⊆ N is a finite set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V a finite set of edges. According to the equivalent relation, we split the graph
Because of the undirected graph's (i.e G = (V , E)) transitivity, authenticating G is equivalent to authenticating G. Fig. 2 shows an example of a transitive graph and its transitive closure.
B. TRAPDOOR HASH FUNCTIONS
A trapdoor hash function TH [22] comprises three algorithms, i.e. TH = (KG, HF, CSF).
• (pk, sk) ← KG(1 k ): Given a security parameter 1 k , this key generation (KG) algorithm returns a private/publickey pair (pk, sk).
• h ← HF pk (m, r): Given a public key pk, message m ∈ M and random r ∈ R, this hash function evaluation VOLUME 6, 2018
algorithm (HF) returns a hash string h ∈ H. The notations M, R and H respectively denote the message, randomness and hash spaces.
• r 2 ← CSF((pk, sk), (m 1 , r 1 ), m 2 ): Given a key-pair (pk, sk), a message/randomizer pair (m 1 , r 1 ) ∈ M × R and a second message m 2 ∈ M, this collision solver function (CSF) algorithm returns a second randomizer r 2 such that HF pk (m 1 , r 1 ) = HF pk (m 2 , r 2 ). Trapdoor hash functions TH = (KG, HF, CSF) satisfy the following two security properties.
1) Collision Resistance: A TH scheme is collisionresistant if Succ
CR A,TH in the following game is negligible (here, Succ CR A,TH is the successful finding collision probability of any efficient PPT attacker A). Let (pk, sk) = KG(k) be a key-pair, and A is given the security parameter k and the public key pk. A succeeds in a polynomial time t to output a collision (m 1 , r 1 ) and (m 2 , r 2 ) for HF pk , satisfying HF pk (m 1 , r 1 ) = HF pk (m 2 , r 2 ) and m 1 = m 2 . 2) Trapdoor Collisions: We call a TH scheme is perfectlytrapdoor if it owns this property: ∀ (sk, pk) = KG(k) and message pair (m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ M × M, if r 1 is uniformly and randomly chosen from R, then r 2 = CSF((sk, pk), (m 1 , r 1 ), m 2 ) ∈ R has a uniform probability distribution on R. There are several trapdoor hash functions have been presented [22] , [37] , all of which can be applied in our proposed TCUGA scheme. The following design called TH DL is used to analyze the performance of our scheme.
• KG: Let H : {0, 1} * → Z q be any collision-resistant hash function, this algorithm chooses a group G of prime order q and x R ←Z * q . Then it computes y = g x ∈ G. Finally, it returns a key pair (pk, sk),
and D G is a description of group G (including the prime group order q).
• HF: This algorithm takes as input the public key pk = (D G , g, y) and message/randomizer pair (m, r) ∈ {0, 1} * × Z q , and computes the hash
• CSF: This algorithm takes as input the key-pair (pk, sk) and (m 1 , r 1 , m 2 ), computes r 2 = r 1 +(H(m 1 )−H(m 2 ))· x −1 (mod q) and returns the second randomizer r 2 .
The above TH DL is collision-resistant assuming that H is collision-resistant and the discrete-log problem is hard in G.
In addition, TH DL satisfies the property of perfectly-trapdoor, more details can be referred in [22] .
C. MODIFIED DIGITAL SIGNATURES BASED ON TRAPDOOR FUNCTIONS
In a traditional digital signature scheme, the signer is equipped with a public/private key pair. And the usual operations of signing, denoted by Sign, and verification, denoted by Verf. We review its algorithms S = (KeyGen, Sign, Verf) as follows.
• (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(1 k ). Given the security parameter 1 k , this key generation (KeyGen) algorithm returns a private/public key pair (sk, pk).
• σ ← Sign(sk, m). Given a private key sk and a message m, this signing algorithm returns a signature σ on m.
• {1, 0} ← Verf(pk, m, σ ). Given a public key pk and a message-signature pair (m, σ ), this verifying algorithm returns either 1 or 0. If returns 1, then σ is a valid signature on m.
Consistence of S. For any message m and any key pair (sk, pk) obtained by invoking KeyGen algorithm, the equation Verf(pk, m, Sign(sk, m)) = 1 holds.
The security model of digital signature schemes, existential unforgeablity under chosen-message attacks (euf-cma) [38] , is defined as a game between a challenger C and an adversary A. The challenger runs KeyGen algorithm to obtain public/private key pair, and gives the public key to A. Moreover, A can adaptively request the signing oracle Sign(sk, ·). Eventually, A outputs a forged message/signature pair (M * , σ ). Here, let Adv euf −cma S,A (k) be the probability that A wins the game, meaning that SVf(pk, M * , σ ) = 1 and M * have been queried. The S is uf-cma if Adv euf −cma S,A (k) is negligible for any PPT adversary A [39] .
In practice, we usually require an appropriate encoding of the signed information to guarantee security of S, e.g., using a cryptographic hash function (e.g., MD6 or SHA-512). In this paper, we replace the standard hash function with a trapdoor hash function TH = (KG, HF, CSF), where the signer holds the trapdoor information for signing the message. The Modified Signature MS scheme has some interesting properties:
1) As in a traditional digital signature scheme, the signer cannot repudiate (or deny) a signature he has generated since only does he know the private key and the trapdoor hash information. 2) The signer can pre-compute a signature σ on a message/randomness pair (m 1 , r 1 ) in the offline phase. After he receives the target message m 2 to sign in the online phase, he can find the collision in the hash by invoking the CSF algorithm to compute r 2 = CSF((sk, pk), (m 1 , r 1 ), m 2 ) ∈ R with the same signature σ . This property is really attritive when considering relief of the realtime computational burden, which makes the modified signature scheme more practical in many applications, specifically for the battery powered mobile devices or real time environment [22] , [37] .
IV. TRANSITIVELY CLOSED UNDIRECTED GRAPH AUTHENTICATION
A Transitively Closed Undirected Graph Authentication (TCUGA) scheme is defined by three PPT algorithms: TCUGA = (TKG, TASign, TAVerf).
• (tpk, tsk) ← TKG(1 k ): Given a security parameter 1 k , the transitive key generation (TKG) algorithm returns a transitive public/private key pair (tpk, tsk).
• TASign = (TASign-Init,TASign-Node,TASign-Edge):
The signing (TASign) algorithm comprises the following PPT algorithms. 
A. TRANSITIVE UNFORGEABILITY
We introduce the security model (i.e. transitive unforgeability) of TCUGA schemes in this section. Define F as a PPT forger with adaptive chosen-message ability against the scheme TCUGA = (TKG, TASign, TAVerf). And we use the following game between F and a challenger C to describe the unforgeability.
• Setup: The challenge C invokes TKG to obtain a public/private key-pair (tpk, tsk), and sends tpk to the forger F.
• TASign queries: F adaptively requests the signature (Cert(v i ), Cert(v j )) on edge (v i , v j ). As a response, C runs TASign and returns (Cert(v i ), Cert(v j )) to F.
Here, let E represent the queried edges set by F to TASign oracle, and V the nodes set involved in E . Eventually, F forges a signature (Cert(v i * ), Cert(v j * )) on edge (v i * , v j * ) using the aforementioned tpk from C. F wins the game if:
2) At least one node is not in G between nodes v i * and v * j , where G = (V ,
V. A NEW TCUGA SCHEME
This section introduces the design details of our TCUGA which can be adopted in BIMSs. Our proposal is based on a modified digital signature scheme MS, among which the hash function in the Sign algorithm is replaced by a trapdoor hash function TH. This modification can efficiently authenticate the dynamically growing graph data, i.e., the signer can efficiently add, modify and delete the relationship (e.g., the same equivalence class) among the nodes in the transitively closed undirected graph.
Next, we specify our scheme as follows. The related system parameters in our scheme are {G, Z * q , g, q, TH}, where TH = (KG, HF, CSF) is a trapdoor hash function used in the MS scheme, G is a group (of prime order q) generated by g. Notably, the signer sends the new message/signature pairs to the administrator when updating the memberships, and the administrator securely broadcasts to the previous queried requestors to invalid the old ones after updating the public label of nodes. This broadcasting operation can be realized by using blockchain to efficiently reduce communicational costs when integrating our proposal into BIMSs.
• TKG: Given a security parameter 1 k , TKG algorithm invokes the KeyGen algorithm of MS to compute (sk, pk) = KeyGen(1 k ), and returns the public key tpk = pk and corresponding private key tsk = sk.
• TASign: The signing algorithm TASign comprises three PPT algorithms: TASign = (TASign-Init,TASignNode,TASign-Edge). 1) TASign-Init: We describe the Signing Initialization algorithm as follows. 
for all the nodes in V , where t ij is a current timestamp used to identify the latest message/signature pair (i.e. one will only believe the latest one when he/she received several message/signature pairs), and
2) TASign-Node: We describe the Signing NodeUpdating algorithm as follows.
-In order to add the node v 0 , the signer processes the following: a) If v 0 ∈ V i , i = {1, 2, . . . , m}, then it utilizes the public label (x i , y i ) of the first node in the ith equivalence class and initializes the label as follows: it randomly chooses r 0 ← Z * p and computes x v 0 = r 0 · x i mod q and y v 0 = r 0 · y i mod q. Finally, the signer signs the node using his/her private key to obtain Cert(v 0 ) = (x v 0 , y v 0 , t v 0 , σ v 0 ), where t v 0 is also a timestamp as above mentioned and 3) TASign-Edge: We describe the Signing EdgeUpdating algorithm as follows. tributes to the existence of edges, the signer can delete the edge (v i , v j ) by deleting the node v i or v j which is the same as the deletion operation in the above Signing Node-Updating algorithm.
• TAVerf: Given a public key tpk, nodes v i , v j and the corresponding candidate signatures (Cert 
If nodes v i , v j are in the same equivalence class, then TVf(tpk,
∃r 0 ∈ Z * q so that x v i = r 0 · x v j mod q and y v i = r 0 · y v j mod q. Meaning that the following equality holds: 
Therefore
Pr
A. TRANSITIVE UNFORGEABILITY
This section relates the transitive unforgeability of our proposal to that of the MS scheme based on trapdoor hash functions.
Theorem 1 (Unforgeability of TCUGA): If the underlying MS is secure, then our proposed TCUGA is unforgeable against an adaptive chosen message forger F in the standard model.
Proof: Assuming that there exists a PPT forger F can break unforgeability of TCUGA with a non-negligible probability Adv tu−cma F ,TCUGA (k). Then there is a PPT adversary A with the public key pk can utilize F to forge the signature of MS with an advantage Adv
Here, A is given pk and the ability of adaptively querying Sign(·) oracle of MS. A's aim is to forge a valid message/signature pair (m, σ ) without querying m itself to the Sign(·). Firstly, A sets tpk = pk and randomly chooses a prime q, then sends (tpk, q) to F. If F queries the signature of edge (v i , v j ), then A executes the process as the real TASign algorithm would, but queries Sign(·) oracle to generate the signatures. Denote V = {V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V m }, m = |V | as the queried vertices set, as a set storing all queried node signatures and T as a table storing all chosen public label. A does the following:
Randomly chooses x 0 ← Z * q , y 0 ← Z * q to obtain the public label (x 0 , y 0 ) of node v i , where (x 0 , y 0 ) / ∈ T . Then update T ← T ∪ (x 0 , y 0 ) and randomly choose r 0 ← Z * q and computes x 1 ← r 0 · x 0 mod q, y 1 ← r 0 · y 0 mod q to obtain the public label (x 1 , y 1 ) of node v j . Then A queries Sign(·) oracle to obtain the signature σ 0 on x 0 ||y 0 ||t 0 and σ 1 on x 1 ||y 1 ||t 1 respectively, where t 0 , t 1 are the current timestamps.
Since v i (or v j ) has been in one equivalence class of V , we can suppose that the public label of v i (or v j ) is (x 0 , y 0 ). Randomly chooses r 0 ← Z * q and computes x 1 ← r 0 · x 0 mod q, y 1 ← r 0 · y 0 mod q to obtain the public label (x 1 , y 1 ) of node v j (or v i ). Then A queries Sign(·) oracle to obtain the signature
be the graph comprised of the edge and vertice queries from F, and
) is regarded as a valid signature if it satisfies the following:
) to A's challenge, and ∀k ∈ N,
F ,TCUGA (k). With this, we have proved Theorem 1.
B. EVALUATION
Our contribution is mainly proposing an efficient authentication scheme for undirected graphs to support BIMSs, hence we do not consider the implementation of BIMSs. Instead, we focus on specifying the advantages of our proposal and deploying it based on the smart contract to show its feasibility.
1) COMPARISON
We compare our proposal with the existing authentication tools for undirected graphs from the view of computation cost. Here, let G be the group of prime order p, N a modulus used in RSA system or integer factoring theory, S ddh the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in G VOLUME 6, 2018 (a gap Diffie-Hellman group). And we use the following abbreviations: let ''stand.'' represent operations involved in the standard signature scheme, ''modif.'' operations of our proposed modified signature scheme, ''exp.'' a modular exponentiation, ''inv.'' the inversion in Z * N , ''RSA Enc.'' an operation of RSA encryption, ''RSA Dec.'' an operation of RSA decryption, ''sq.root'' a square root modulo N , and ''ops.'' the number of bit operations.
As shown in Table 1 , existing undirected transitive signature schemes are efficient for Member Increase Operation (i.e. adding edges and vertices), but not for Member Decrease Operation (i.e. deleting edges and vertices). Although TGAA-BM [36] can support both Member Increase Operation and Member Decrease Operation, the price is to recompute all the certificates of nodes in the equivalence class which needs updating edges or vertices. Obviously, our scheme is more efficient in this point, since the signer only need to update the corresponding nodes but all the nodes in our scheme. Moreover, the signer only need to recompute the hashing using his/her trapdoor information for the updating nodes without the need of re-signing the nodes. The other improvement is that our scheme can efficiently prove the No-existent Edge through simply providing the certificates of two queried nodes.
2) PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We also give the time cost of sub algorithms involved in our TCUGA scheme. Notably, we utilize the RSA digital signature scheme [38] with the modification of hash function replaced by the trapdoor function TH DL (mentioned in Section III-B). And we use the pairing-based library (version 0.5.12) 1 and the gnu multiple precision arithmetic library (version 6.0.0a) 2 for our simulation. Table 2 shows our testing platform information, and Table 3 gives the concrete results (where the updating algorithm executed in changing memberships only refers to executing TH DL function). According to Table 1 and Table 3 , one can find that our TCUGA is more efficient and practical, for which the proposed scheme takes the advantage of conveniently updating memberships (i.e., supporting efficient add or We develop Smart Contract on ManageLabel 1 using Solidity in a private Ethereum network (without the need of transaction fees but with the same accurate results as that of a public one). The private chain is constructed in our personal computer (see Table 2 for system information). After our design smart contract is published in the private chain, we use Web3j (a lightweight library for Java applications) to evaluate the functions. Note that our goal of this implementation is to be compatible with the BIMS environments. However, the existing Solidity does not provide the APIs of complex cryptographical operations (e.g. Encryption, Signature) at the time of this research, we only realize the easy label management using smart contracts and still execute the functions of Signature in the external environment.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Blockchain-based applications will be increasingly popular, and correspondingly there will be new requirements in such applications. In this paper, we studied the membership authentication requirement in BIMS. Specifically, we designed a novel transitively closed undirected graph authentication scheme for BIMS. In comparison to other competing authentication schemes for undirected graph, our proposal is more efficient in terms of the capability to dynamically add or delete nodes and edges. Moreover, our scheme can efficiently solve the authentication of non-existent edges, which is a known challenge in transitive signature schemes. We also provided the security analysis in the standard model and the performance evaluation.
In our scheme, however, the requestors may receive several certificates of one node, among which old certificates (that are still valid -i.e. can successfully pass the verification) may be utilized to trick other users. Therefore, one potential future extension is to integrate designated verifier signatures in our scheme to prevent the malicious propagation of nodes' relationship certificates. 
